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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE
POSSIBILITIES OF LIVING-CONSTITUTION THEORY FOR A
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE REHNQUIST COURT

ERIC R. CLAEYS*
Professor Merrill has offered a provocative thesis about the Rehnquist
Court and its federalism revolution, and he has also demonstrated in action a
new genre of Supreme Court retrospective.1 Generally speaking, I have three
reactions. First, Merrill’s method offers several useful warnings to law
professors about mistakes to avoid while summing up the work of institutions
like “the second Rehnquist Court.” Second, while Merrill’s lecture focuses on
descriptive behavioral explanations of the second Rehnquist Court, it
underscores how urgently we need competent idea-based accounts of that
Court’s work, intentions, and legacy. Third, I suspect that the best way to
produce such an idea-based account would be to study the Rehnquist Court in
light of “living-Constitution” theory.
My comments proceed in two parts. In Part I, I offer a few reflections
about the genre—the “applied” empirical political-science retrospective—that
Professor Merrill seems to have invented. In Part II, I explain why livingConstitution ideas might do the best job of capturing the essence of and
ambiguities in the Rehnquist Court’s legacy, and I sketch out how a livingConstitution retrospective of the Rehnquist Court might look.
I. THE LIMITS OF AN EMPIRICAL POLITICAL-SCIENCE RETROSPECTIVE
Professor Merrill has rendered a useful service simply by sending a shot
across the bow of the constitutional-law establishment. He has raised some
serious and important questions about whether traditional Supreme Court
retrospectives are edifying. First, Merrill warns constitutional-law professors
not to place too much faith in what Supreme Court Justices say in their
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. Thanks to Richard Brumbaugh for his
research assistance and to the editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their editorial
assistance. Thanks also to Professor Merrill, Dean Goldstein, and to William Hof, Childress
Lecture Editor of the Law Journal, for inviting me to comment on Professor Merrill’s Childress
Lecture. The reader should note that, while I clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist in October
Term 1995, my comments here in no way reflect the views of the Chief Justice.
1. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).
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opinions, but, instead, to pay closer attention to what they do behind closed
chambers.2 Second, Merrill warns constitutional-law professors not to play too
fast or loose when they try to unify all the cases with a few pithy
generalizations about law, government, and politics.3 Both are good warnings
for constitutional-law professors to hear from time to time.
At the same time, the traditional retrospective has more to say on its own
behalf than Professor Merrill recognizes. Indeed, Merrill’s methods and
argument only reinforce how urgently we need careful and attentive studies of
the political and jurisprudential themes that go farthest in unifying the Supreme
Court’s work. To study the “Rehnquist Court,” and especially the “second
Rehnquist Court,” Professor Merrill borrows on the empirical methods
developed by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,4 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold
Spaeth,5 William Eskridge,6 and others7 to study descriptive behavior
tendencies on the Supreme Court. Professor Merrill’s lecture, however, has a
slightly different focus.
Merrill’s retrospective is a sort of “applied” empirical study of the
Supreme Court. It stands in relation to the leading empirical work on the
Supreme Court on a footing similar to that in which an engineering project
stands to Newtonian physics. Some of the leading works, like Lee Epstein and
Jack Knight’s work The Choices Justices Make, justify rational-choice
Supreme Court analysis as an autonomous discipline. Such works lay the
groundwork for further analysis of the Court along rational-choice lines.8
Others, like William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s game-theoretic study of
Supreme Court statutory interpretation, focus more on a narrow subset of the
Court’s work, but still offer general lessons about how the Supreme Court
behaves within that subset.9 Professor Merrill’s retrospective, by contrast,
stretches out even further from general social-science method and theory to
particular data. Merrill is not looking for cases that will help him test a
2. See, e.g., id. at 651 (“start[ing] not with ideals, but with the assumption that the Justices
rationally are seeking to maximize certain preferences”).
3. See id. at 571 (doubting that “the Court’s recent behavior can be neatly subsumed under
any single conceptual rubric”).
4. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
5. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A
Rationale Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996); Linda R. Cohen
& Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at
65.
8. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 4, at xiv.
9. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 6.
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behavioral theory he finds interesting. He already has a fixed group of cases—
the cases handed down while William Hubbs Rehnquist has served as Chief
Justice—and it is incumbent on him to decide which are interesting, what they
say when taken together, and why they were decided as they were.
Professor Merrill demonstrates that empirical political science can help
answer these questions. His argument, however, also tends to suggest that any
such “applied” empirical retrospective is bound to rely heavily on the same
“ideational approach[es]” and “unifying Weltanschauung[s]” that cause him to
disparage the format of the traditional Supreme Court retrospective in the first
place.10 The political scientists in attendance at Professor Merrill’s lecture are
better qualified than I to judge its contributions to their discipline. From a
legal scholar’s perspective, however, it seems that an ideational approach is an
indispensable element even of Merrill’s seemingly empirical and descriptive
retrospective. Furthermore, at the end of the day, the ideational approach has
more to say about the sorts of questions legal scholars are inclined to ask about
the Supreme Court.
Let us start with the most simple problem imaginable. If we are going to
study the Rehnquist Court strictly empirically, where do we begin? Why do
we choose to focus on what Professor Merrill calls the “‘federalism’ basket”
and the “‘social issues’ basket”?11 The answer is fairly straightforward.
Merrill is sensible enough to step outside his empirical framework long enough
to focus his study on the issues that common political opinion finds
interesting—the constitutional-law cases that “generate the most public
comment and controversy.”12 Still, if those common political opinions can
single out the cases that are worth studying along empirical lines, there is no
reason why they cannot serve the same function for a thematic or idea-based
study of the Supreme Court.
Professor Merrill resists this conclusion. He is inclined to doubt any ideabased study of the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional federalism cases unless it
can account also for the Court’s preemption, dormant Commerce Clause, and
First Amendment cases.13 Here, however, he seems to hold thematic studies of
the Rehnquist Court to a higher standard than he holds his own thesis. In his
Conclusion, Merrill rests satisfied because he has shown that the constitutional
federalism project—and only the federalism project—”[a]t least . . . is
explainable” in rational-choice terms.14 As Alan Howard suggests, it is not at
all obvious that Merrill’s thesis could hold if extended beyond federalism to
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 571.
11. Id. at 580.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 570-71 & n.7 (criticizing and distinguishing John O. McGinnis, Reviving
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 485 (2002)).
14. Id. at 651.
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areas like the First Amendment.15 Merrill’s thesis about the Court’s federalism
cases is useful scholarship, even if it cannot explain the Justices’ strategic
behavior in First Amendment cases. Nevertheless, the same could be said of
any ideational study of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases. So far, then,
realist empirical method already is borrowing on political theory and political
opinion, but it has not yet made any distinctive contribution.
Separately, group opinions about law and politics are important causal
forces to account for—even in the strictest “empirical” analysis of an entity
like “the second Rehnquist Court.” Professor Merrill has recognized as much
in previous scholarship. In The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, Merrill and Joseph Kearney explained how the movement to deregulate
common-carrier utilities over the last twenty-five years stemmed in large part
from “ideological consensus . . . about the virtues of markets as the dominant
mode of industrial organization for delivering public utility services.”16 “This
transmission of ideas,” Merrill and Kearney concluded, “unquestionably has
had a pronounced effect on the shape of public policy.”17
If anything, what Merrill called “the transmission of ideas” plays an even
stronger role in his study here than it did in his and Kearney’s study of utility
regulation. Economic interests, of utilities and their customers, go a long way
in constraining the freedom of action regulators and legislators have in making
utility policy in the public interest. What a difference life tenure makes.18 As
Merrill documents here, Supreme Court Justices may need to anticipate the
strategic moves made by their brethren and, to a certain extent, constraints set
by electoral trends outside the Court.19 Even so, because of life tenure,
guaranteed salaries, and separation of powers, Justices have far more freedom
of action than most regulators to do their jobs consistent with their personal
opinions about the public interest. Because elite consensuses about law and
politics inform their opinions, such consensuses count heavily in even the most
descriptive and empirical accounts of the Court’s work—including the
observations Professor Merrill makes throughout his lecture on attitudinal
preferences, internal strategic-actor behavior, and flux and stasis.20 Thus, even
when behavioral methods show how Justices maximize their preferences, they
must acknowledge that political and jurisprudential opinions play some part in
shaping the Justices’ preferences in the first place.

15. See Alan J. Howard, Continuity on the Court: The Rehnquist Court’s Free Speech Cases,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 835 (2003).
16. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1398 (1998).
17. Id. at 1403.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
19. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 601-38.
20. See id. at 590-620, 638-51.
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Finally, it must be recognized that Professor Merrill’s retrospective makes
a trade-off that will strike many readers as unacceptable. To gain the
advantages of what he calls the “harsh realism of political science,”21 Professor
Merrill trades away the chance to say anything at all about whether the
Rehnquist Court’s work contributes to the true, the just, or the good. Because
Merrill focuses on the behavioral and strategic aspects of the Rehnquist
Court’s work, his lecture is most interesting to the empirical scientists whose
theories he is road-testing. As he notes, however, he is a law professor,22 and
most of the members of his audience are law professors or lawyers. His lecture
holds out at least some useful lessons for lawyers. Nevertheless, at the end of
the day lawyers will be—and should be—interested not in whether Justices on
the Rehnquist Court were clever strategists, but whether their legacy makes for
good constitutional law and good government.
Taking everything Merrill says as true, he teaches us the country has
experienced a mini-revolution in constitutional federalism in part because
Justice Thomas votes his mind, in part because Justice Scalia’s trades votes
with skill worthy of Justice Brennan, and in part because Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy mind the election returns. This account, if true, would be useful
descriptive data, but I suspect most lawyers and law professors would want to
know more. There are good behavioral reasons (and bad gossipy reasons) to
know that the Court is wheeling and dealing, and to know why. Lawyers and
citizens, however, are also supposed to take seriously and live by the
explanations the “Federalism Five” offers in Court opinions as to why
constitutional federalism makes for good government. Over the long run, the
latter court more than the former for everyone except, perhaps, full-time
empirical scientists. It is no wonder, then, if the legal academy and practicing
lawyers turn from empirical studies like Professor Merrill’s back to idea-based
studies to consider the Rehnquist Court’s legacy for the course of American
constitutional law.
II. LIVING-CONSTITUTION THEORY AS THE FOUNDATION FOR A
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE REHNQUIST COURT
I will use the rest of my Comment to propose such an idea-based
retrospective—a “living-Constitution” retrospective. Professor Merrill is right
in saying that no one theme, idea, or conceptual rubric can rationalize all of the
cases decided during the Rehnquist Court. Still, a few themes capture the bulk
of the cases that most observers would consider “significant.” If I had to pick
one, to make as much sense of as many of the most important cases as I could,
I would survey the Rehnquist Court’s work from the standpoint of “livingConstitution” theory. Because this theory plays an influential role in politics
21. Id. at 571.
22. See id.
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and constitutional interpretation today, it identifies several constitutional
principles and decisions that most everyone agrees are “important.”
Accordingly, it creates a useful normative complement to the kind of
retrospective Professor Merrill has presented.
A.

Living-Constitution Theory

In its simplest form, living-Constitution theory holds that the “fundamental
law” of the United States consists of the American people’s historically
evolving beliefs about good government and individual liberty. The object of
any form of government is to secure liberty to the people governed, but factual
and moral conditions change too much to say that any one conception of
“liberty” will best protect the people in all circumstances. Living-Constitution
theory purports to solve this dilemma by making the Constitution a vehicle for
the people’s changing conceptions of liberty. As political scientist and
President Woodrow Wilson, one of the seminal living-Constitution theorists,
explained the project, “government is not a machine, but a living thing. . . . It
is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions
by the sheer pressure of life.”23
Because political conditions are adaptive and popular morals are
historicist, the Constitution has no independent and objective legal meaning. It
is impossible to construe the Constitution staying fully within the four corners
of the document because the document is a legal transmitter for the American
people’s evolving fundamental moral law. As Wilson again explained, the
Constitution is not “a mere lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its
spirit is always the spirit of the age.”24 As the will of the American people
changes from age to age, there will be “normal and legitimate alterations of . . .
constitutional understanding,”25 because “governments have their natural
evolution and are one thing in one age, another in another.”26
B.

The Predominance of Living-Constitution Theory

Living-Constitution theory has more influence over constitutional
interpretation and adjudication now than any other political or constitutional
theory. Speaking for the entire Democratic Party, Vice President Al Gore
asserted in one of his debates with now-President George W. Bush that “the
Constitution ought to be interpreted as a document that grows with our country

23.
(1908).
24.
25.
26.

WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56
Id. at 69.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
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and our history.”27 Living-Constitution ideas permeate mainline contemporary
constitutional scholarship. To take just one leading example, Professor
Ackerman’s We the People series and his theory of “constitutional moments”
interpret American constitutional history as a process of “ongoing construction
of national identity” and “collective self-definition.”28 Such theory also has
gathered considerable respect and acceptance in many areas of constitutional
law. For instance, the second Justice Harlan is now revered for describing the
Due Process Clause as relying on a historical tradition that is “a living thing.
A decision of [the Supreme] Court which radically departs from it could not
long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound.”29 This dictum laid the basis, for instance, for Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirming the constitutional right to an
abortion.30
This summary hits the high points, but it still understates livingConstitution theory’s influence. Most constitutional scholars associate livingConstitution theory with individual-rights guarantees like the Eighth
Amendment’s limits on the death penalty,31 the Equal Protection Clause’s bar
against racial segregation,32 and especially the Due Process Clauses’ protection

27. First Presidential Debate Between George W. Bush and Al Gore (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000), transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/
DailyNews/debate/001003_trans_4.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
28. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 33 (1991); see also id. at 44;
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 11 (1999); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, Term 2000—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(2001); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457 (2001); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996) (developing other theories of constitutional interpretation and constitutional change
that borrow heavily on living-Constitution premises).
29. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986). According to
Justice Brennan:
[T]he ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For the
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs.
Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958))).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in
Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 793 (2002) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided
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of sexual contraception and abortion.33 Constitutional law professors,
however, tend not to appreciate how integral living-Constitution theory is to
structural constitutional law as well. Woodrow Wilson and like-minded
theorists developed living-Constitution theory at the turn of the twentieth
century, primarily to discredit the understandings of federalism and separation
of powers that, as of 1900, stood in the way of a national welfare state
administered by an independent bureaucracy.34 The theory prevailed in
politics, providing a political roadmap for the Progressive social-reform
movement and the New Deal. It did not, however, gain traction in the law
reports immediately, in large part because it seemed so radical to lawyers and
judges at the time.35 Instead, the key New Deal cases and post-New Deal
constitutional law scholarship rationalized the New Deal transformation in
more value-neutral and legalistic Legal Realist and Legal Process terms.36
As a result, while political theorists have understood the political
implications of living-Constitution theory for two decades,37 it is only within
the last five years or so that legal academics have started to recover how
central the Progressive living-Constitution project has been to an entire
century’s worth of constitutional interpretation. To mention some of the more
noteworthy examples, historians Howard Gillman38 and G.E. White39 have
started to retrace the connection between living-Constitution theory and early
primarily on the basis of living-Constitution principles about equality, not on the basis of socialscience findings about how racial segregation affects African Americans).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; id. amend. XIV, § 1; see also sources cited supra notes 2930.
34. See THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); FRANK J. GOODNOW,
SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 3-11 (1911); Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers
and the Administrative State, in THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS: CRISIS IN THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 20, 31-39 (Gordon S. Jones & John A. Marini eds., 1988).
35. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 56-57 (1993).
36. For analyses of the problems with the standard Realist and Process accounts of the
Commerce Clause, see Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. (forthcoming 2003), and Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000). The standard Realist and Process accounts of
separation of powers are now known as the “functionalist” account of separation of powers. See
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-93 (1987).
37. See, e.g., Charles R. Kesler, Woodrow Wilson and the Statesmanship of Progress, in
NATURAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL RIGHT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HARRY V. JAFFA 103 (Thomas
B. Silver & Peter W. Schramm eds., 1984); JOHN MARINI, THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL:
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 39-48 (1992).
38. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the
Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 191 (1997).
39. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

745

twentieth-century constitutional development. Meanwhile, in constitutional
theory scholarship, Barry Friedman has made a valuable contribution by
showing that problems with Progressive living-Constitution ideas led to the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty,” which has plagued constitutional law ever
since. Friedman has shown that this difficulty is an accidental by-product of a
choice New Deal jurists made when they declined to uphold the New Deal
political agenda explicitly on its Progressive merits, and, instead, upheld it
using Legal Realist and Legal Process theories explaining why the courts
should generally defer to Congress.40
To be sure, living-Constitution theory is not the only body of political and
jurisprudential theory influencing modern constitutional law. As John O.
McGinnis has demonstrated, there is a strong case to be made that the
Rehnquist Court, especially the five moderate and conservative Justices on the
Court, is reviving an understanding of the Constitution consistent with the
political principles of Alexis de Tocqueville and the American Founders.41
There are, however, even stronger reasons for starting with living-Constitution
principles. Assuming Tocquevillean and originalist ideas explain where the
“Federalism Five” want to go, living-Constitution theory explains where they
are starting from. More importantly, they also help explain why Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy are not in as much of a hurry to get there as the other
members of that coalition. Separately, even if, as Professor McGinnis
suggests, the more conservative Justices are sympathetic to Tocquevillean
classical liberalism, on its own terms, their jurisprudence is not classically
liberal.42 The conservatives may reject living-Constitution theory as they
understand it, but they subscribe to some of the assumptions that distinguish
modern liberalism from classical liberalism. McGinnis’ survey of the Court’s
work suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project will gather steam;
I think a retrospective based on living-Constitution ideas would give a much
more clear-headed and realistic diagnosis, explaining why there are real limits
to how far that project can extend in principle.
C. Prioritizing the Constitutional Developments During the Rehnquist Court
Because living-Constitution theory is first a political theory, it prioritizes
how important different constitutional developments are in relation to each
other, and marks off the topics most “important” to the living-Constitution
project. The first goal of living-Constitution political theory was to establish a

40. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty (pt. 5), 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
41. See John O. McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence in the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 875, 876 (2003) [hereinafter McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence]; McGinnis, supra note
13.
42. See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 38, at 241-44.
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national bureaucratic welfare state, and the preservation of such a state
continues to be the paramount goal of such theory now. As a result, the three
most critical goals in the living-Constitution project relate to property,
federalism, and separation of powers—making sure that federal courts defer to
Congress in all three areas. Once the New Deal established a firm
constitutional commitment to a national bureaucratic welfare state, Congress
and bureaucracies could secure for the American people the liberty they
showed they wanted during the New Deal, namely economic security.
Once the courts had disengaged from the welfare-state project, they freed
themselves to focus on other living-Constitution issues relating to equality and
individual self-expression. With respect to equality, one clear priority was to
make the Equal Protection Clause43 a transmitter for evolving attitudes against
race-based segregation. It remained an open question, however, whether that
evolving consensus also barred affirmative action, and whether it reached
gender-based discrimination and possibly discrimination on other grounds, as
well.
By contrast, it was fairly clear within a living-Constitution framework that
other individual-rights guarantees had to expand. When the American people
decided during the New Deal to protect their economic interests collectively,
they sacrificed constitutional property rights that had constituted an important
realm of freedom and self-expression. Evolving conceptions of liberty
demanded that the people receive new individual rights to make up for the
rights they gave away. During the 1950s and 1960s, then, the federal courts
began to countenance the proliferation of self-expression rights relating to
what Professor Merrill calls the “social issues”—contraception and abortion,
and probably also new understandings of free speech and religious free
exercise.
The main outlines of the living-Constitution project confirm Professor
Merrill’s basic instincts about the “federalism” and “social issues” cases,44 but
they suggest he should have examined a few other lines of cases. Because the
Rehnquist Court’s federalism project goes against the grain of the structural
commitments of living-Constitution theory, Merrill is absolutely right to
suggest that this project deserves attention. By the same token, however,
Merrill should have considered putting the Court’s regulatory-takings law in
the same category,45 and also why separation of powers law was nowhere near

43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 580-87.
45. Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (construing the Takings
Clause to cover regulatory takings that wipe out all economic value in land without controlling
traditional nuisances), with Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (construing Lucas narrowly to apply only to regulations that eliminate economic
value permanently); see also Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights,
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as active as constitutional federalism over the course of the Rehnquist Court.
Similarly, Merrill is surely right to regard the due process “social issues” as
flash points. Racial equality, affirmative action, and gender equality, however,
probably provide equally compelling flash points, too.
D. Putting the Rehnquist Court in the Proper Historical Perspective
Second, living-Constitution theory provides a context for comparing the
Rehnquist Court’s work against the work of earlier Courts. This historical
perspective also is difficult to draw within a strictly empirical framework like
Professor Merrill’s. Because living-Constitution ideas have played a part in
most of the important constitutional developments over the last three or four
generations, they help reveal which trends on the Rehnquist Court break with
prior trends on the Burger, Warren, and New Deal Courts.
The Rehnquist Court marks a period of equipoise in American
constitutional law that lags, as often happens, about a decade after a similar
period of equipoise in American politics. The Nixon Era in the early 1970s,
and then especially the Reagan-Bush Era from 1981-92, marked a political
reaction against the Great Society—against increasing taxation, expanding
entitlements, and cultural liberalism. They could not roll back the New Deal or
the Great Society, but they could, at least, prevent further expansion in the
same direction.46 With varying degrees of success, Republican presidents
Nixon, Reagan, and the first Bush tried to appoint to the Supreme Court
nominees who saw the constitutional program of the Warren Court pretty much
as their electoral base saw the Great Society. By the appointment of Justice
Thomas in 1991—really the beginning of what Professor Merrill has called
“the second Rehnquist Court”—these three Republican Presidents had finally
appointed a working majority on the Court.
The Rehnquist Court has slowed, but not rolled back, developments in
constitutional law tracking the Great Society in politics. From 1937 to Lopez47
in 1995, there held a consensus on the Court that property rights, federalism,
and separation of powers were off the table. A few takings cases and
separation of powers cases cut the other way,48 but these cases were tiny
bumps along a generally smooth road.
The Rehnquist Court marks a state of equipoise after this period of
expansion. In the case of the Commerce Clause, for instance, several of the
Justices in the majority have made it abundantly clear they do not want to roll

88 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2003); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).
46. See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT
TO REAGAN 594-96, 607-17, 637-38 (1990).
47. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
48. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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back the New Deal. They do want to insist that Congress respect precedents
like Wickard v. Filburn49 and Heart of Atlanta Motel50 as high-water marks for
federal jurisdiction, but they do not want to call such precedents into
question.51 The “social issues” show the same tension. Casey52 and Stenberg
v. Carhart53 suggest that the Court is not going to roll back the constitutional
rights to abortion or sexual contraception anytime soon, but cases like
Washington v. Glucksberg54 suggest that further expansion of constitutionallyprotected liberty will take place slowly, if at all. Within these broad outlines,
the conservative and liberal wings of the Court engage in nip-and-tuck battles
over more incremental attempts to expand the coverage of other constitutional
individual rights.
This historical perspective helps explain why the Court seems more
contentious than it has in many years. From conservatives’ point of view, it
has been twenty-three years now since President Reagan was elected, but Roe
v. Wade55 is still good law.56 Many of the major conservative victories over
the last decade hang on 5-4 margins. Moreover, even in a period in which
individual-rights guarantees have expanded haltingly, they have expanded in
ways that conservatives criticize, and the Court has generated a lot of dicta that
could blossom if the Democrats ever manage to appoint a fifth reliably liberal
Justice. From liberals’ point of view, it is frustrating not to have a Court that
can reliably be counted on to expand the scope of individual-rights guarantees.
The Court’s federalism project is unlike anything anyone has seen in the last
sixty years. Most of all, liberals probably feel as if they have dodged a few
bullets. It is frightening for them to contemplate what might happen if
President George W. Bush and future Republican Presidents ever learn how to
choose nominees who stay as reliably faithful to conservative constitutional
commitments as Democratic appointees do to liberal constitutional
commitments.
E.

Clarifying the Theoretical Alternatives After the Rehnquist Court

Finally, living-Constitution theory helps focus on the theoretical issues
raised by the Rehnquist Court’s work, the questions that are will remain urgent
to citizens, lawyers, and academics even after Chief Justice Rehnquist has
49. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
50. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
51. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (insisting that “[s]tare
decisis operates with great force in counseling” the Court “not to call in question the essential
principles now in place” over federal commercial regulation ever since the New Deal).
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
54. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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stepped down. The Rehnquist Court has been a time of theoretical ferment,
raising questions about the objects of constitutional interpretation more radical
than anything the Court or legal academy has seen since the New Deal.
Whether they like or not, all of the Justices on the Court have a strong opinion
about the concept of a “living Constitution.” Moreover, whether they agree
with it or not, each of their varying approaches to constitutional interpretation
has been shaped by living-Constitution theory.
Four of the Justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—
subscribe to a constitutional agenda essentially consistent with the livingConstitution project as it was understood during the late Warren Court and the
Burger Court. Because these Justices’ views accord with the mainline in
constitutional interpretation over the last thirty to forty years, they raise
familiar questions. One is, can judges really discern the “evolving will of the
people,” especially if that will is a more comprehensive and fundamental
source of moral authority than the mental faculties of any one person?57
Separately, the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” still remains: If dominant
theories of adjudication hold that courts should defer to Congress and state
legislatures when it comes to reviewing structural constitutional questions and
property-rights questions, how do courts justify applying high levels of
scrutiny to other constitutional guarantees?58
The Rehnquist Court, however, is a time of ferment because a majority of
the Court is calling the living-Constitution project as we have known it since
the Warren Court into doubt. Three of the Justices—Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas—have rejected living-Constitution theory.
Chief Justice Rehnquist agrees with the living-Constitution theory that
constitutional phrases like “due process” have no fixed meaning. He breaks
with that theory, however, because he doubts that judges have any principled
basis to say that they know better than anyone else how the people’s views are
evolving.
Thus, he recommends that courts defer to the people’s
representatives, who are better-suited to adapt the Constitution to the times for
the people.59 Justice Scalia seeks to avoid similar subjectivity problems by
trying to apply a series of purely objective principles for interpretation—
textualism, originalism, and historical meaning, among others.60 While Justice

57. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 36.
58. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Friedman, supra note 40.
59. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976).
60. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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Thomas has not yet explained his approach to constitutional interpretation in a
systematic way, he has made clear he prefers some mix of textual—and
original—meaning interpretation.61
It is significant enough that these three Justices have broken sharply with
thirty years or more of constitutional interpretation, but living-Constitution
theory also helps assess the breaks they have made. It may come as a surprise,
but Justice Scalia’s and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s breaks are not as radical as
they think. Both disagree with the living-Constitution project, but they do so
only on the basis of a deeper agreement with some of the first principles of that
project. Living-Constitution project holds that constitutional clauses must
change with the times because they have no inherent meaning, and also that
such clauses cannot have inherent meaning because political and moral
principles have little or no permanent content.62 As Philip Hamburger and
Howard Gillman have suggested, this view is not the only view in our
constitutional history. Founding Era and nineteenth-century American jurists
believed that constitutions instituted into positive law permanently true
political principles. Legislation and case law might vary from place to place
and time as public officials tried to satisfy constitutional principles in practice,
but the principles at which they aimed were right everywhere and always.63
While the verdict is still out on Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist agree with most twentieth-century constitutional theorists
that political morality has no permanent content; they merely draw different
conclusions from mainline theorists about how a judge is supposed to resolve
all the theoretical problems that follow from that premise. If we have
reservations about their theories of interpretation, we may want to ask whether
the reservations follow from the parts of their theories that break from livingConstitution interpretation, or from the parts that subscribe to livingConstitution premises.64
Finally, living-Constitution theory also helps us to understand better the
role that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have played on the Rehnquist Court.
Simplistic portraits of the Rehnquist Court portray it as a 5-4 Court, but, as

61. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reconsidering all of the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents from 1937 to 1995 because they
do not square with the plain and original meanings of the Commerce Clause).
62. See WHITE, supra note 39, at 3-4, 232-33; Gillman, supra note 38, at 213-19; Claeys,
supra note 36.
63. See Gillman, supra note 38, at 213-19; Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989).
64. Howard Gillman has suggested such a criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See
Gillman, supra note 38, at 241-43; see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at the Gregorian
University, Rome (May 2, 1996) (transcript available from Catholic News Service) (insisting in
the question-and-answer session that, in a democratic constitutional order, “what the majority
decides shall be the rights of minorities is what their rights are”).
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Professor Merrill recognizes, it is more accurate to characterize the Court as a
5-4 Court on “federalism” issues, but a 3-6 Court on “social issues.”65 Even
this characterization is too simplistic. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy side
with the conservatives, but only around the margins. They are not going to
subscribe to any interpretation of the Commerce Clause or Takings Clause that
may threaten the constitutional revolution of 1937.66 They side with the
liberals in that they subscribe to the basic principle that non-property
individual-rights guarantees grow and evolve with changing popular attitudes,
and they refuse to repudiate earlier living-Constitution precedents like Roe v.
Wade.67 On the other hand, they are more cautious than the liberals about
discovering new constitutional meanings.68
It is difficult to explain in a theoretical way exactly how and why Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy manage to straddle this middle ground on the Court.
No doubt, one of the explanations is that both Justices dislike comprehensive
jurisprudential theories. Still, the dislike of theory is a theoretical position, and
it should be judged for what it is. In addition, we must understand Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy as best we can, because they are now and will
continue to remain the swing votes on the Court.
Living-Constitution ideas shed some unexpected light on Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy’s positions. Their positions are similar in many ways
to the positions of early twentieth-century Progressive moderates. These
moderates subscribed to the basic premises of the living-Constitution project,
but they insisted that social change proceed more slowly than Progressive
liberals and New Deals eventually did. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy favor
a similar approach in the context of the current Court. They favor federalism
and states’ rights, but they tend to cite reasons that moderate Progressives
would have understood, not necessarily reasons out of The Federalist.69 Thus,
John McGinnis does not give Justices O’Connor and Kennedy their due when
he suggests their caution stems from stare decisis considerations. 70 They
really do subscribe to the New Deal argument that the Commerce Clause is
65. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 629-38.
66. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring with O’Connor, J.) (warning
that stare decisis “forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve
only an 18th-century economy”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (warning that the “Takings Clause, while conferring substantial
protection on property owners, does not eliminate the police power of the State”).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Compare, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (subscribing to a living Constitution
interpretation of the Due Process Clause to reaffirm Roe), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joining a Court opinion refusing to recognize a
fundamental liberty interest in a right to assisted suicide).
69. See Claeys, supra note 36.
70. See McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence, supra note 41, at 877.
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obsolete as originally drafted, and they understand the states’ roles differently
as a result. The living-Constitution tradition helps us situate and clarify
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s jurisprudence, which is the first step toward
assessing it.
This living-Constitution perspective provides a framework for identifying
the “key” developments and battlegrounds on the Rehnquist Court. It seems to
present issues in a light that partisans on all sides should consider fair. To be
sure, it raises more questions than it answers. The questions it raises, however,
seem to be the kinds of questions one would want to answer to understand and
evaluate the Rehnquist Court’s legacy.

